Respected sir,
I have read your work on intellectual property and I also read Dr. F. Hayek’s essay on intellectuals and socialism. I did not think they were connected until now. A friend of mine when I presented your arguments against intellectual property to him expressed it thus, [continue reading…]
Despite my frequent criticisms of libertarian activists and activism over the years, and despite my preference for the theoretical side of things, I’ve been involved in various activist projects for over the years, including helping to draft early versions of the Liberland Constitution. 1 I’ve met Liberland’s President, Vít Jedlička, and previous meetings of the Property and Freedom Society. At this year’s meeting, he invited me, Alessandro Fusillo, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe to the upcoming Liberland meeting in Prague this December, which includes a “Reading of the Constitution of the Free Republic of Liberland,” and a Christmas Party. Sounds like fun. [continue reading…]
Dear Stephan,
I’m writing to you because I want to know what you think about my liability theory and if it’s consistent with Rothbardian natural law, and I remember in your Causation and Aggression paper [Causation and Aggression], you said libertarians have not fully fleshed out a liability theory.
So here’s the thing. I believe a lot of Austro-libertarians are holding contradictions in their view because they claim to be praxeologists in law but they allow unintentional behaviors into their liability theories. This never made much sense to me. I believe that the only genuine behavior that is liable under libertarian legal theory is if it was intentional, i.e., an action. [continue reading…]
I received an email from one Jared Lewis, attaching his draft paper “Philosophical and Ethical Underpinnings of Tautological Natural Rights” (July 8, 2025). He asked me for my comments his argument, about natural rights theory and the use of thresholds or scalar attributes (e.g., intelligence), build on the Rothbardian view that rights must be grounded in clear, non-arbitrary principles; “whether this commitment rules out any ethical system that bases rights on gradable traits—whether in definition or implementation.”
My comment: “since you asked nicely and professionally unlike so many clueless libertarians, sure. But if it’s too much to take in perhaps we could chat via zoom. Send it on.”
He sent it. As I was in a hurry, I ran it through Grok, which I used to write a quick email reply. I then Grok for its review of my email to Lewis. Below is my letter to Lewis, plus both Grok analysis. Enjoy. (I will not append his paper here as it is a draft and he did not (yet) consent to my posting it.) [continue reading…]
Allen Gindler, “Refining the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP): A Formal Approach to Bystander Intervention” (draft; 2025).
Abstract:
This paper addresses a critical ambiguity in the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP), a cornerstone of libertarian philosophy that prohibits initiating force against others. While effectively guiding two-party interactions, the NAP lacks clarity regarding third-party bystander intervention. Utilizing formal logic and set theory, this study identifies a logical NULL state inherent in traditional NAP formulations, which leaves bystander actions undefined. To resolve this, the paper introduces a modified NAP (MNAP), explicitly permitting voluntary, consent-based bystander intervention. The proposed refinement enhances the practical applicability of the NAP in complex multi-agent scenarios, offering libertarian societies a coherent framework for ethically and legally addressing immediate situations of aggression through consensual collective action.
Related
Alessandro Fusillo recently appeared on LA NOSTRA LIBERTÀ [OUR FREEDOM] – FUSILLO live – Puntata 156 (01-10-2025).
A summary and translation of the transcript are provided below. [continue reading…]
Christos Armoutidis, “Who Owns Public Property? Libertarian Property Theory and the Problem of Immigration,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 29 (2): 56–71
Related:
No time to read just yet, but here is Grok: [continue reading…]
Dear Mr. Kinsella,
I am [], greets again. I hope this message finds you well. Sorry to bother you, but I would like to ask you a question regarding “use-based property” and argumentation ethics.
We know that capitalists own means of production, often through inheritance. However, if we cannot determine historically who first acquired these means, or whether the property was originally obtained through theft, it is usually justified under the principle of homesteading. My question is: if we cannot provide ontological evidence for the ownership of scarce resources, and if a resource is not in active use, would such ownership be illegitimate? [continue reading…]
Related:
Someone snarkily suggested I read Hayek’s Road to Serfdom. As if I hadn’t. Just because I’m not a Hayek fan. In my view, other than his Capital theory (Pure Theory of Capital, which I hear is good but have never read; I think Hoppe said maybe only 3 people have read and… pic.twitter.com/nkqHuMLDWV
— Stephan Kinsella (@NSKinsella) September 30, 2025
Related
Re discussions with @Fhoer and Hoppe re Usury from an OrdoNaturalist Perspective A Hoppean Critique of Contractually Invalidity Interest. Abstract:
This article proposes a critique of the practice of usury — understood as the imposition of contractually invalid interest — from an OrdoNaturalist approach inspired by Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. Unlike utilitarian, Marxist, and religious views, which treat usury as acceptable if useful or condemnable if exploitative, it is argued here that usury is null ab initio because it violates the principles of self-ownership and contractual reciprocity. The text distinguishes legitimate loans, based on mutual risk and limited guarantees, from usurious loans, characterized by unlimited liability, perpetual debt, and the alienation of the debtor’s autonomy. It concludes that usury is incompatible with natural order and constitutes a disguised form of economic slavery.
The piece argues that certain debt arrangements are invalid ab initio because they violate self-ownership and reciprocity.
An edited exchange: [continue reading…]
Re Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (1991) 1
ChatGPT query:
summarize and analyze the attached book by Oakeshott. Provide a concise overview followed by a chapter by chapter summary. Consult the work of Hans-Hermann hoppe, Stephan Kinsella, and Murray Rothbard, on the internet and in the attached documents. Is Oakeshott compatible with the libertarian views of Kinsella and Hoppe and Rothbard? If not, explain where they would differ or disagree with Oakeshott’s approach and parts Hoppe might agree with. What part would libertarians influenced by Hoppe, Rothbard, and Kinsella most agree with or profit from?
Stephan Kinsella is a libertarian writer and retired patent attorney in Houston, Texas. He has published widely on various areas of libertarian legal theory and on legal topics such as intellectual property law and international law. His publications include Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Papinian Press, 2023), Against Intellectual Property (Mises Institute, 2008), International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford, 2020), and The Universal Principles of Liberty (2025).
My Failed Libertarian Speaking Hiatus; Memories of Mises Institute and Other Events, 1988–20192025
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