R.W. Bradford of “Liberty” Magazine on Rights

Some may recall that a few years back R.W. Bradford, editor of Liberty, argued that the age of “moralistic” or “rights-based” libertarianism a la Rothbard and Rand, had passed, and had evolved to a superior pragmatic or consequentialist view (I’m recalling from memory here). That is, he dismissed the non-aggression principle as some kind of simplistic, undefendable position.

So it’s kind of interesting how Bradford tries to use the non-aggression principle in the latest (March 2004) issue, in support of his anti-war position. In a reply to a pro-war libertarian, Bradford writes:

You propose that the libertarian ethical imperative against initiating force is incomplete, and suggest that it ought not to apply “in the world of nation-states.” My view is that the non-initiation principle ought to be considered a general ethical rule, rather than an ethical imperative, so we have no real argument here. I should add, however, that I do not share your proposal that nation-states be exempted from it. It seems to me that states should be bound more tightly by it than should individuals.

I.e., the non-aggression principle is not really a rigorous, real principle for libertarianism; at best, it is some kind of suggestion or rule of thumb. And yet, this “non-rule” should be applied more strictly against states than against individuals. What? Why? If it’s just a suggestion, or rule of thumb, what does it mean to apply it more stringently…? Does he mean that it’s a real ethical imperative when it comes to states?

This is yet another example of why ethical skepticism is inevitably self-defeating. Those who engage in normative arguments, ultimately, have no choice but to adopt some normative, moral views. Rights-skeptics and similar types thus either (a) fall into contradiction when they start to utter moral or normative opinions; or (b) if they want to remain consistent, must just keep their mouths shut and not enter the moral fray.