Background

Against Intellectual Property (AIP) originated as a Journal of Libertarian Studies article in 2001. At the time there was less interest among libertarians in the topic of intellectual property (IP) than there is now. Libertarian attention was more focused on issues such as taxes, war, central banking, the drug war, government education, asset forfeiture, business regulations, civil liberties, and so on. Not so much on patent and copyright, the two primary forms of IP.

I had no reason to think it was an especially important issue, but I had always been dissatisfied with various libertarian arguments for IP, and it kept nagging at me throughout college and law school. Ayn Rand’s brief article on patent and copyright, for example, included strained arguments as to why a 17 year patent term and a life-plus-50 year copyright term were just about right. She also offered a confused argument as to why it was fair for the first guy to race to the patent office to get a monopoly that could be used against an independent inventor just one day behind him.

1“Against Intellectual Property” first appeared as part of the symposium Applications of Libertarian Legal Theory, published in the Journal of Libertarian Studies 15, no. 2 (Spring 2001); it was later published as a monograph by the Mises Institute in 2008 and again by Laissez-Faire Books in 2012. The 2001 article was based on “The Legitimacy of Intellectual Property,” a paper presented at the Law and Economics panel, Austrian Scholars Conference, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama, March 25, 2000. It has also been translated into various languages, including, to-date, Czech, French, Georgian, German, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian and Spanish. See www.stephankinsella.com/translations. AIP and many other works cited herein are available at www.stephankinsella.com/publications and www.c4sif.org/aip. A version of this article, with hyperlinks, is available at www.c4sif.org/aip. This article is published under a CC0—no rights reserved (public domain) license. And yes, it’s actually been 21 years, not 20.


3As Rand wrote there:
As an objection to the patent laws, some people cite the fact that two inventors may work independently for years on the same invention, but one will beat the other to the patent office by an hour or a day and will acquire an exclusive monopoly, while the loser’s work will then be totally wasted. This type of objection is based on the error of equating the potential with the actual. The fact that a man might have been first does not alter the fact that he wasn’t. Since
It made no sense to me, and didn’t seem to fit in well with other aspects of libertarian theory and individual rights. I believed Rand’s approach was wrong, or at least flawed, since natural property rights can’t expire at an arbitrary time, much less one decreed by legislation, but I still assumed IP rights were, somehow, legitimate property rights. Since I was increasingly interested in libertarian theory (my first scholarly libertarian article was published in 1992)¹ and was beginning to specialize in IP in my law practice (in 1993),² I figured that I might be able to come up with a better defense of IP than previous libertarians had managed. So I dove deep into the literature and tried to find a way to justify IP rights, only to keep hitting dead ends. Every argument I could come up with was as flawed and shaky as Ayn Rand’s.

And in my research I came across libertarian and other criticisms of IP, and also deepened my understanding of the crucial role of scarcity to property rights, as emphasized in particular by Hans-Hermann Hoppe. I began to see that older criticisms of IP, such as the writings of Benjamin Tucker, Wendy McElroy, Sam Konkin, and Tom Palmer, were correct, even if their criticisms were not comprehensive or complete. With a relief similar to the one I felt when I finally gave up minarchism and ceded the ground to anarchism, I finally concluded that patent and copyright are completely statist and unjustified derogations from libertarian principles and property rights. No wonder I had been failing in my attempts: I had been trying to justify the unjustifiable!

So I sought to build on the work done by previous thinkers, and clarify and expand it. I gave a few local talks and wrote some short articles on the topic starting in 1995, often with a somewhat tentative tone as I was initially concerned that publicly opposing IP law might harm my budding IP law practice (turns out, it never caused a problem). I then wrote a lengthier treatment, which became AIS, mostly to get it out of my system, intending to then turn my attention back to other fields that interest me more, like rights theory, contract theory, causation, and other aspects of libertarian legal theory.

I presented the paper, then entitled “The Legitimacy of Intellectual Property,” at the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s Austrian Scholars Conference in March 2000. As I recall, this was the year Objectivist George Reisman started attending Mises Institute events, after having been ousted from Objectivist circles over his favorable remarks about Barbara Branden’s biography of Rand, and had reunited with his old friend Ralph Raico, from whom he had been estranged for many years. I remember Reisman asking me, after I

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10See, e.g., various chapters to be included in Law in a Libertarian World, at www.stephanksella.com/lw/.
delivered my paper, something like, “Let me make sure I understand you. Are you saying all patent and copyright law should be abolished?” I answered yes and, seeming somewhat stunned, he slowly doddered away. In any case, I submitted the paper to the JLS, where it was published as “Against Intellectual Property,” a title suggested by Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe, then the journal’s editor.

The Internet Era and the Growing IP Threat

As noted above, IP had not received a great deal of attention from libertarians before the Internet era. But IP’s wallflower status was about to change. Some were starting to sense that the IP issue was becoming more important. The need to shine a light on patent and copyright, heretofore relegated to the shadows and the bailiwick of specialists, was becoming more apparent. An early sign of this among Austro-libertarians, perhaps, was the Mises Institute’s awarding AIP the O.P. Alford III Prize for 2002.11

The Internet is the reason for IP emerging from the shadows. The Internet—and digital information and file sharing, social media and related technologies like cell phones, texting, and ubiquitous video cameras—was at this time gaining steam and becoming a huge social force. It was becoming one of the most important tools to fight statism and to preserve and extend human freedom and prosperity. And this is why it has been under attack by the state, in the guise of anti-pornography, anti-gambling, and anti-terrorism, as well as anti-piracy/copyright protection efforts.

The Internet became the world’s biggest copying machine, leading to a dramatic increase in the amount of copyright infringement, and thus in the amount of copyright lawsuits and penalties.12 At the same time, news of shockingly excessive, absurd, and outrageous copyright persecutions were instantly and widely communicated over the Internet—college students and single mothers sued for millions of dollars for sharing a few songs.13 No longer were these lawsuits hidden in the dark; Internet users were starting to be made aware of them.14

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11http://mises.org/page/1475/Mises-Institute-Awards#Alford.
12In fact, one of my earliest publications on IP concerned one of the first streaming-music services, which was killed by the copyright industry. See Kinsella, “In Defense of Napster and Against the Second Homesteading Rule,” LewRockwell.com (September 4, 2000). Napster “originally launched on June 1, 1999, as a pioneering peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing software service with an emphasis on digital audio file distribution. … As the software became popular, the company ran into legal difficulties over copyright infringement. It ceased operations in 2001 after losing a wave of lawsuits and filed for bankruptcy in June 2002.” “Napster,” Wikipedia (retrieved May 11, 2022).
Patent outrages and abuse also increased along with a growing tech sector and economy and were also communicated at light speed to blogs and RSS feeds. And in the meantime the traditional content-producers, ever-resistant to new technologies that disrupt comfortable, established business models, kept lobbying Congress to ratchet up patent and copyright scope and terms and penalties and enforcement, while at the same

By 1991 I noticed that [hip-hop] music had changed. The new work lacked the texture and richness that had marked the finest albums of the late 1980s, such as Public Enemy’s *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back* and the Beastie Boys’s *Paul’s Boutique*. Instead, the digital samples of others’ music that made up the intricate bed of sound in those great albums was replaced by a thinner, less interesting, less intricate collection of more obvious samples. The language of sampling seemed to become simpler and less interesting. There was less play and less depth to the music by 1992. I knew that several hip-hop artists had faced copyright suits over sampling in 1990 and 1991. So I wondered if the law had had such a profound effect on the art. After a bit of research, I concluded that it had. With a bit more research, I sought to explain the larger, longer relationship between copyright and creativity in American history. That project became the germ of my first book, published in 2001, *Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity*.

By 2001 copyright had exploded into public consciousness, largely through the remarkable rise and fall of Napster, the first easy-to-use digital file-sharing service. The United States had radically expanded copyright law in the 1990s in anticipation of the “digital moment.” But nothing had prepared the copyright industries for the torrent of unauthorized peer-to-peer distribution over the Internet, starting in about 2000. Meanwhile, computer software had blossomed from a mere hobby to a multibillion-dollar global industry in the 1980s and 1990s without any clear sense of how intellectual property would work for it (or against it). At about the same time that U.S. courts ruled that software could enjoy the protection of patent law as well as copyright, the movement to lock computer code open for the benefit of security, stability, quality, and creativity (and, to some, humanity) grew to be called the “Free and Open-Source Software” movement. As someone thrown into the copyright battles of the early twenty-first century despite my training as a nineteenth-century cultural historian, I felt compelled to make sense of these and other trends that were remaking our global information ecosystem. Those interests are reflected in my second book, published in 2004, *The Anarchist in the Library: How the Clash between Freedom and Control Is Hacking the Real World and Crashing the System*.

The copyright wars of the first decade of the twenty-first century yielded a global “Free Culture” movement, with law professor Lawrence Lessig as its intellectual leader. Globally, others concerned with issues beyond copyright and creativity, including biopiracy and the cost of pharmaceuticals in developing nations, launched the “Access to Knowledge” movement. During the decade the industries devoted to expanding and strengthening intellectual property succeeded in legislatures and courts around the world. And the United States embedded intellectual property standards into trade treaties with other nations. The issues were becoming more interesting and important every week.

Then, in late 2004 Google announced it would begin to scan into electronic form millions of books from dozens of university libraries—many of which would still be covered by copyright. The ensuing debate and lawsuits drew me into the fascinating world of search engines, Internet policy, and the future of libraries and books. That research generated my third book, published in 2011, *The Googlization of Everything and Why We Should Worry*.

time the US bullied other countries to keep ratcheting up their own IP laws and enforcement. This culminated in the attempt to enact anti-piracy legislation such as the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect IP Act (PIPA), which was—at least for the moment—derailed by a historic Internet uprising.

For these reasons, in the last couple decades, as IP become a more apparent threat to property rights, freedom of expression, and the Internet, the issue became more prominent and libertarians of various stripes—Austrians, anarchists, left-libertarians, civil libertarians, and the young and Internet dependent—started to become more interested in the IP issue and more receptive to anti-IP arguments. And more and more libertarians are writing on this important topic and building on, incorporating, or extending previous analyses, calling for significant reform of IP law or even outright abolition. In addition, outside of libertarianism proper, a host of economists, empirical researchers, and legal scholars, most notably economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine, authors of the

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groundbreaking Against Intellectual Monopoly, have expressed deep skepticism, on empirical grounds, of the claimed pro-innovation effects of patent and copyright.\(^{20}\)

The issue continues to receive attention from a variety of institutions and outlets. I have myself been interviewed, lectured, and debated countless times on this topic, including on the Stossel show and the Reason.tv-sponsored Soho Forum debate.\(^{21}\) I also gave a six-part lecture course on IP for the Mises Academy in 2010 and reprised in 2011,\(^{22}\) and I have continued to write on the topic.\(^{23}\)

What about the prospects for reform of patent and copyright law? While more and more libertarians have come to see IP law as unjust, it is unlikely to see much legislative progress on this matter due to widespread confusion about property rights and entrenched special interests, in particular Hollywood and the American music industry, which rely on copyright, and the pharmaceutical industry, which profits from the patent system. That said, it seems unlikely that copyright terms—once 14 years extendable to 28, and then life of the author plus 50 years, and now life of the author plus 70 years—will be extended any further. And while patent and copyright law will stay on the books for a long time, technology will make them increasingly harder to enforce. Piracy of copyrighted works is already rampant due to the Internet and encryption. As 3D printing technology advances, we may see an increased ability of consumers to evade patent law as well.\(^{24}\)

**Changes**

I’ve been asked from time to time what changes I would make to AIP. In my assessment, the basic arguments in AIP are sound. I have yet to see a valid criticism.\(^{25}\) I might change the structure somewhat, or an emphasis or wording here and there. For example, I would clarify that scarcity is meant in the technical economics sense of


\(^{23}\)See, e.g., Kinsella, “A Selection of my Best Articles and Speeches on IP,” CASIF Blog (Nov. 30, 2015), and other material at www.stephankinsella.com/publications/#againstip.


rivalrousness. I might even propose the use of the term “conflictable,” to emphasize the nature of resources that gives rise to property rights in the first place, and to head off silly arguments like “well IP is justified since good ideas are scarce.” Also, I might use “corporeal” or “material” instead of “tangible.” I would try to be more careful to use the term property to refer not to the owned resource that is the subject of property rights, but only to the relationship between the owner and the resource owned. I would streamline the initial section providing a positive legal description of the main forms of IP, and eliminate the Appendix providing examples of obvious IP abuse, since this can be done now in an easily updated online page or post.

Additions

But I would not change much, substantively speaking. However, since writing AIP over 20 years ago, I have found additional ways of explaining the fundamental problem with IP law—additional arguments, examples, and evidence. So I would add some material, as I did to some degree in a later paper. I’ll briefly outline below some of the arguments developed after the initial publication of AIP.

27 In AIP I sometimes used the term “tangible” to indicate scarce resources that can be subject to property rights. Hardy Bouillon argues that it might be more precise to focus on the difference between material vs. non-material goods rather than tangible vs. non-tangible goods, as the touchstone of things subject to property rights. As Bouillon writes:

Though some speak exclusively of tangible and non-tangible goods, I prefer to talk of material and immaterial goods. … The point about material goods is not that they are tangible, for some are not. For instance, atoms and many other small material units are not tangible; they are identifiable only indirectly, though this does not prevent us from calling them material.


28 For more on this, see Kinsella, “Property: Libertarian Answer Man: Self-ownership for slaves and Crusoe; and Yiannopoulos on Accurate Analysis and the term ‘Property,’” StephanKinsella.com (April 3, 2021) (“Property is a word with high emotional overtones and so many meanings that it has defied attempts at accurate all-inclusive definition. The English word property derives from the Latin proprietas, a noun form of proprius, which means one’s own. In the United States, the word property is frequently used to denote indiscriminately either the objects of rights … or the rights that persons have with respect to things. Thus, lands, automobiles, and jewels are said to be property; and rights, such as ownership, servitudes, and leases, are likewise said to be property. This latent confusion between rights and their objects has its roots in texts of Roman law and is also encountered in other legal systems of the western world. Accurate analysis should reserve the use of the word property for the designation of rights that persons have with respect to things.”).


31 Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” Libertarian Papers 5, Art. no. 1 (2013): 1-44, restates the basic case against IP and incorporates some new arguments developed after AIP.
Empirical Evidence

In the “Utilitarian Defenses of IP” section of AIP I explained various defects in the utilitarian case for IP. First, as Austrians have explained, value is not a measurable, cardinal quantity that can be interpersonally compared.\textsuperscript{32} Second, even if violating someone’s rights to take their resources and redistribute it to someone else makes the recipient better off, it is still a rights violation. And third, the proponent of IP, arguing that IP laws lead to net utility gains, has the burden of proof.\textsuperscript{33} And it has become increasingly clearer, in the last 60+ years, that those arguing for IP on empirical grounds have not yet satisfied and cannot satisfy their burden of proof that IP makes us better off.\textsuperscript{34} As I wrote in a subsequent paper, “Given the available evidence, anyone who accepts utilitarianism should be opposed to patent and copyright.”\textsuperscript{35}

IP Rights as Negative Easements\textsuperscript{36}

Additionally, I have come to understand that IP rights can be properly classified as non-consensual negative easements (or servitudes),\textsuperscript{37} which makes plain exactly how they infringe justly-acquired property rights.\textsuperscript{38} All property rights are enforceable rights in material, scarce—conflictable—resources, the type of scarce means that human actors can possess and manipulate and employ to causally interfere in the world. It is not that assigning property rights in information or knowledge is wrong, but that it is impossible. Force cannot be applied to “ideas” or information, but only to scarce resources. Any IP right is just a disguised reassignment of property rights in existing scarce resources. One reason for the confusion here is that people are not careful in distinguishing between motivations and means.

For example it is sometimes said that people “fight over religion.” But this is not accurate. Religion is not a scarce resource over which there can be conflict. Any interpersonal human conflict is always over scarce, material, conflictable resources. If A kills B or takes his land or cows in a religious dispute, the religious disagreement is just the motivation or reason for the conflict or clash, but the clash is always over the material things

\textsuperscript{32}See n. 41 in AIP, also Murray N. Rothbard, “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” in Economic Controversies (Auburn, Al.: Mises Institute, 2011). For a recent article debunking David Friedman’s scientific and confused contention that “Von Neumann” proved that utility can be measured cardinally, see Robert P. Murphy, “Why Austrians Stress Ordinal Utility,” Mises Wire (Feb. 3, 2022).


\textsuperscript{35}“Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” p. 11.

\textsuperscript{36}See also the section below on “Resources, Properties, Features, and Universals.”

\textsuperscript{37}Servitude is the civil law term; easement the common law term. See Gregory W. Rome & Stephan Kinsella, Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary (New Orleans, La.: Quid Pro Books, 2011). IP rights can also be classified as incorporeal movables, although this classification has no relevance here. See Kinsella, “Are Ideas Movable or Immovable?”, CASIF Blog (April 8, 2013).

that are the real subject of property rights. We can explain a given human action by reference to the ends aimed at, and the means employed. One’s motivations and goals factor into the ends; but the actual means employed and the actions taken are what property rights concern.39

All rights are human rights, and all human rights are property rights,40 and property rights just are rights to the exclusive control of certain conflictable resources.41 In the end, every law, every dispute, boils down to some actor being assigned ownership rights in a given contested resource. A copyright grant gives the holder a partial property right in the printing press and computers of other people. A patent grants the holder a partial property right in the factories and raw material already owned by others. Such rights are negative easements that permit the holder to veto or prevent certain uses by the owner. Negative easements are legitimate when consented to, but in the case of IP the state grants these rights to the IP holder without the consent of the owner of the burdened property (the so-called “servient estate”). Thus, IP rights amount to a taking or infringement of property rights otherwise established in accordance with the principles of original appropriation and contract.42 This insight buttresses the argument in AIP that “a system of property rights in ‘ideal objects’ necessarily requires violation of other individual property rights, e.g., to use one’s own tangible property as one sees fit.”43


42 Kinsella, “How To Think About Property,” StephanKinsella.com (April 25, 2021). A third principle, related to contractual transfer, is a transfer of resources made for purposes of rectification. This can be viewed as a special case of a contractual title transfer. See Kinsella, “The Limits of Libertarianism?: A Dissenting View” (citing Roderick Long and Robert Nozick); also idem, “KOL345 | Kinsella’s Libertarian “Constitution” or: State Constitutions vs. the Libertarian Private Law Code (PorcFest 2021),” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (June 26, 2021); and “Nobody Owns Bitcoin,” StephanKinsella.com (April 21, 2021).

Lockean Creationism

In the “Creation vs. Scarcity” section of *AIP* I pointed out that one mistake made by many proponents of IP is the notion that creation is a source of property rights. But it is not. I have elaborated on this topic in subsequent writing, pointing out that creation—i.e., production, transformation, or rearrangement of existing resources—is a source of *wealth* but not a source of property rights. After all, transforming a set of input resources into a more valuable output product requires that the input factors already be owned. The resulting product is thus owned according to standard property rights and contract principles.

Property rights in one’s body are based in one’s direct control over one’s body. Property rights in external, previously unowned scarce resources, come from original appropriation, or homesteading—first use and transformation or embordering—of an unowned scarce resource, or by contractual transfer from a previous owner. Production or transformation of existing, already-owned resources may increase or create wealth, but is not a source of rights. This is a common confusion among libertarians, especially Randians and those influenced by the confused labor theory of property and the related labor theory of value, as can be seen in nonsensical sayings like “you have a right to the fruits of your labor.”

The Labor Metaphor

Overreliance on “labor” metaphors also leads to confusion about IP. Locke correctly argued that the first person to “mix his labor with” an unowned resource owns it, since he thereby establishes an objective link to the resource which gives him a better claim to it than latecomers. However, Locke based his argument on the confused and unnecessary idea that a person “owns” his labor and “therefore” owns resources that he mixes it with. But labor is not owned—it is an *action*, something a person performs with his body, which he does own—and this assumption is not needed for the Lockean labor-mixture argument.
to work. This mistaken notion leads some people to favor IP because they figure that if you own a scarce resource because you mix your labor with it, you also own useful ideas that are produced with your labor. The related Smith-Ricardo-Marx labor theory of value, which underlies Marxism and socialism, is also sometimes used to support IP, as when people argue that if you work or labor you “deserve” some kind of reward or profit. All this focus on labor must be rejected as overly metaphorical and confused, and, frankly, Marxian.51

The Separate Roles of Knowledge and Means in Action

The purpose of property rights is to permit conflict-free use of resources, the scarce means of action that humans employ to causally interfere with the course of events, in an attempt to achieve their ends. But this applies only to conflictable resources. Human action also implies the possession of knowledge by the actor—knowledge of what ends are possible and knowledge of what scarce means might be employed to causally achieve the desired end. Thus all successful human action requires two separate components: the availability of scarce means or resources, and knowledge to guide one’s action.52 Property rights apply only to the scarce means or conflictable resources that humans employ, but not to the knowledge or information people possess, which guides their behavior, since anyone can use the same or similar knowledge to guide their own actions without conflict. In fact, it is the accumulation of this technological knowledge over time that enables increasing material prosperity. Property rights are needed to permit conflict-free use of scarce resources, but imposing restrictions on the emulation, learning, and use of knowledge, which is what IP attempts to do, impoverishes the human race.53

Resources, Properties, Features, and Universals54

As noted above (see note 28), confusion about the IP issue sometimes stems from identifying “property” with the owned resource. People then get bogged down in loaded or confused questions like “are ideas property?” If one keeps in mind that the question is not what is property, but rather, who is the owner of a conflictable resource, then the IP mistake is harder to make. A related mistake stems from the failure to understand that all human rights are property rights, and all property rights just are rights to the exclusive control of a


54See also the section above on “IP Rights as Negative Easements.”
given scarce (conflictable) resource. But every property right is an ownership right held by a given particular person or owner, with respect to a particular conflictable resource. It is the actual resource itself which is owned, not its characteristics.

For example, if you own a red car, you own that car, but you do not own its color; you do not own red or redness. If owning a red car meant you owned its characteristics, you would own not only that particular car, but its age, weight, size, shape, color, and so on, and, thus, would thereby have an ownership claim over any other object that is red, and so on. This would amount to reassigning ownership rights in someone else’s red car to the you, even though he owns that car and you did not homestead it or obtain it by contract. Likewise, information cannot be owned since it is not an independently existing thing; information is always the impattering of an underlying medium or carrier or substrate, which is itself a scarce resource that has an owner. If I own a copy of Great Expectations, I own that physical object: paper and glue and ink. It has various characteristics: an age, a size, a shape, and a certain arrangement of ink on its pages—the way the ink is impatterned so that it represents letters and words and meanings to someone who can read and who can observe the features of the book. But just as you don’t own the color of your car, you don’t own the way an object is arranged or shaped.

As Roderick Long explains,

It may be objected that the person who originated the information deserves ownership rights over it. But information is not a concrete thing an individual can control; it is a universal, existing in other people’s minds and other people’s property, and over these the originator has no

55To be even more precise, I would say that a property right is not a right to use a resource, but a right to exclude others from using a resource. In practical terms this gives the owner the ability to use it as he sees fit so long as he is not using trespassing on others’ property rights. This follows from the analysis in Kinsella, “The Non-Aggression Principle as a Limit on Action, Not on Property Rights,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010) and “IP and Aggression as Limits on Property Rights: How They Differ,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010). However, we need not delve into this nuance here.

56J. Neil Schulman argued for years for a form of IP known as “logorights.” Oddly, perhaps partially in response to my relentless criticism of his flawed argument, he eventually changed his argument to argue for “media-carried property,” thus implicitly acknowledging that he was in favor of property rights in characteristics, or features, of owned objects, i.e. universals. See my “Introduction” to J. Neil Schulman, Origent: Why Original Content is Property Origent: Why Original Content is Property (Steve Heller Publishing, 2018), and “KOL208 | Conversation with Schulman about Logorights and Media-Carried Property,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (March 4, 2016).

57Even the pro-IP Ayn Rand implicitly acknowledged this. As she wrote:

The power to rearrange the combinations of natural elements is the only creative power man possesses. It is an enormous and glorious power—and it is the only meaning of the concept “creative.” “Creation” does not (and metaphysically cannot) mean the power to bring something into existence out of nothing. “Creation” means the power to bring into existence an arrangement (or combination or integration) of natural elements that had not existed before.

legitimate sovereignty. You cannot own information without owning
other people.58

All Property Rights Are Limited

One final argument may be addressed, which is touched on in some of the above
sections.59 When explaining why IP rights violate property rights, we IP opponents explain
that the grant of an IP right is tantamount to a nonconsensual negative easement on
someone else’s property—it limits what the owner of a resource may do with the resource.60
Or, as Roderick Long would say, “Owning Ideas Means Owning People.”

A common response runs something like this: “Yes, IP rights limit what you can
do with your own property. But this is true of all property rights. My ownership of a home,
or my body, means you can’t shoot your gun at it. So my property rights limit your property
rights. Therefore just because intellectual property rights limits your property rights doesn’t
mean they are illegitimate any more than my self-ownership limits your property rights in
your gun.”

There are many problems with this argument, as I have detailed elsewhere.61 First,
even if we grant that in some cases property rights can be limited, it does not imply that
just any limit is legitimate. If a woman objects to being raped, it will not do to say “stop
complaining that we are violating your property right in your own body; after all, all
property rights are limited.” You would need to articulate why it’s justified to limit property
rights. In the examples given by pro-IP opponents, someone’s property rights are limited
as needed to keep them from exercising those rights to commit aggression against others’
property rights. But IP rights limit the owner’s property rights (again, in the form of a
negative servitude) even though the owner, in rearranging his own resources in a certain way,
does not invade the borders of the inventor’s or author’s property. In response to this, the
IP proponent will say, “yes, by making a copy of the author/inventor’s creation, the copier
is infringing the author/inventor’s property rights.” But this is question-begging. It
presupposes that there are rights to universals, when this is the issue under dispute.

58Long, “The Libertarian Case Against Intellectual Property Rights” (emphasis added). See also the section
above on “IP Rights as Negative Easements,” and: Kinsella, “Mr. IP Answer Man Time: On Steel and
Swords,” C4SIF Blog (Feb. 4, 2022); “How To Think About Property”; “Libertarian Answer Man: Mind-
Body Dualism, Self-Ownership, and Property Rights,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 29, 2022); “KOL337 | Join
the Wasabikas Ep. 15.0: You Don’t Own Bitcoin—Property Rights, Praxeology and the Foundations of
Private Law, with Max Hillebrand”; “KOL219 | Property: What It Is and Isn’t: Houston Property Rights
Association,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast,” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (April 28, 2017); and “Nobody Owns
Bitcoin.” See also Patrick Smith, “Un-Intellectual Property” (March 4, 2016).
59See, e.g., the discussion in the section “Resources, Properties, Features, and Universals,” above.
60See, the section above on “IP Rights as Negative Easements.”
StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010) and “IP and Aggression as Limits on Property Rights: How They Differ,”
StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010).
Second, it is simply not true that property rights limit other property rights. Rather, property rights limit actions. If A owns his body, then B may not shoot it with a gun, *whether he owns the gun or not*. The point is that B may not use or invade the borders of A’s body—his owned resource—with *any* means at all, whether it be the use of B’s hands, or some other means such as a gun, even if he stole the gun from C and is not its owner. People are responsible for their actions, and actions always employ some means to achieve the end. The means may be simply the actor’s own body, or it may be some external object, one that may be owned by the actor, or not.62

Therefore, it *is* a valid criticism of IP that it unjustly limits others’ use of their own resources.

Conclusion

I may someday provide such an updated treatment, tentatively to be entitled *Copy This Book*, building on *AIP* and taking into account more recent arguments, evidence, and examples.63 In the meantime, readers of *AIP* may find useful the suggestions in this article and others compiled in my C4SIF blogpost “Selected Supplementary Material for *Against Intellectual Property*” (March 1, 2012), which is updated from time to time.

STEPHAN KINSELLA
Houston, May 2022

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62Likewise, many libertarians, having in mind some form of “strict liability,” advance the confused idea that we are responsible for harms done with property (resources) that we own. This is incorrect. We are responsible only for our actions, not for uses to which inanimate objects are put. If I possess a stolen knife, I am liable if I stab an innocent person with it, even though I don’t own the knife, since it is my *actions* that I am responsible for. And if some thief steals a knife and uses it to harm an innocent victim, it is the thief that is responsible, not the owner of the knife. One common confusion held even by many libertarians is the idea (which underlies many assertions about “strict liability”) is the idea that ownership implies responsibility (some have even confusingly said that you “own your actions,” which is incoherent). It does not. Ownership means the *right to control* (or, more precisely: the right to exclude others from controlling) a given resource; it does *not* imply responsibility. We are responsibly only for our actions, regardless of whatever means are employed by the actor to achieve the illicit end.

63See [www.copythisbook.com](http://www.copythisbook.com).