I was long friends with Tibor Machan (see Remembering Tibor Machan, Libertarian Mentor and Friend: Reflections on a Giant). We corresponded for years and met many times in Auburn when I would attend Mises Institute events. When I lived in Philadelphia, from 1994–97, we would occasionally get together when he was passing through. As I recall, he introduced me one time to Patrick Burke. I think we had lunch together. Burke was a nice and gentle man, from what I dimly recall, a religion professor at Temple in Philly. He has apparently passed away in the meantime, as has Tibor.
In any case, I read his book No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market (1994), which had just been published and which we had discussed at lunch. It was decent but flawed, if earnest. I published a critical review of it in Tibor’s journal Reason Papers in 1995, Stephan Kinsella, “Book Review of Patrick Burke, No Harm: Ethical Principles for a Free Market (1994),” Reason Papers No. 20 (Fall 1995), p. 135. Ultimate I critique his “harm” criterion, just as I critique a similar the similar approach opposing “imposing costs” on others by J.C. (Jan) Lester in his book Escape from Leviathan: Libertarianism without Justificationism.
See, e.g,. Stephan Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights,” in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) (LFFS), n.16 and accompanying text; idem, “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights,” in LFFS, at n.3 and accompanying text; idem, “‘Aggression’ versus ‘Harm’ in Libertarianism,” Mises Economics Blog (Dec. 16, 2009); and idem, “Hoppe on Property Rights in Physical Integrity vs Value,” StephanKinsella.com (June 12, 2011).
Burke’s focus on “harm” as the key principle behind rights, instead of aggression, leads him into error, for example accepting the legitimacy of blackmail and defamation law, and even laws banning dueling, since “a challenge to a duel is akin to blackmail.” His view of contracts is also flawed since it is based on the notion of detrimental reliance (which I critique in “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability,” in LFFS, at Part I.E).
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